Th eory on Mistake as a Simple Delusion
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Nature and Characteristics
According to it, mistake is a discrepancy between any subjective state of mind and objective reality. For example, Pothier perceived mistake as subjective misconception as true of something wrong 3 . Later on, other prominent lawyers (Savigny, Pugliatti and Carnelutti) have defi ned it in a similar way. Th ey describe the mistake as a case in which there is a false impression of reality 4 .
Th e theory of mistake, as a simple delusion, has many supporters in Bulgaria. Under our old Law of Obligations and Contracts (LOC) 5 mistake has been defi ned as the erroneous notion that we have on something 6 . At the same time, another author gives such a defi nition. He understood mistake as a discrepancy between reality and subjective perceptions of it 7 .
Th is theory is widely spread in modern continental civil law doctrine. Famous French lawyers defi ne mistake as consideration of something false as true and vice versa -as consideration of something correct as a falsehood 8 . Th e fi rst part of that defi nition is largely infl uenced by the above mentioned Pothier's notion of mistake. German civil law theoreticians have defi ned the same phenomenon as "a false understanding of the actual situation" 9 , similarly to considerations of Savigny, Pugliati and Carnelutti.
A large number of contemporary writers in Italian and Bulgarian doctrine also share the theory of mistake as a simple delusion. Th e reason for putting them together in a group is the similarity of their two features. Firstly, I have found continuity between these contemporary views and the foregoing opinions on mistake. It can be observed in several key points -they both support the idea that delusion represents an essential element of mistake; in addition, contempo-2 Delusion designates a particular state of mind in which there is misconception about realityso Vasilev, L. Grazhdansko pravo na NRB. Obshta chast. 3 prerab. i dop. izd., S., 2000, p. 320. Further on, I will utilize both terms (delusion and misconception) with equal meaning. rary views do not hesitate to borrow from the previously mentioned defi nitions of mistake. Th e second feature of similarity consists of introducing of additional remarks on fi eld of misconception by some Bulgarian and Italian authors sharing that theory of mistake. I will briefl y describe their views.
A group of Italian authors includes in the perimeter of misconception not only false but also distorted representations of reality 10 . Compared with the definition of mistake given by Pothier, their argumentation seems to extend the fi eld of mistake as a ground of nullifi cation of contracts. But, on the contrary, we should have in mind that the latter formula is infl uenced by local case law. It includes a distorted view of reality in the fi eld of misconception not to broaden the mistake's fi eld of application but to show diff erent reasons (spontaneous or induced by others 11 ) causing that ground of nullifi cation of contracts.
As I have already mentioned, many Bulgarian authors also accept the theory of error as a psychic fact 12 . A view expressed in our doctrine deserves special attention. It highlights two hypotheses of misconception.
13 Th e fi rst is the case where there is a diff erence between specifi c individual state of mind and reality. I could confi rm that fi rst hypothesis harmonizes perfectly with the views of analyzed theoretical direction. According to the second hypothesis, delusion encompasses situations where there are certain subjective representations on something which in reality completely lacks.
It seems to me that the formula I have just described sticks pretty closer to the concept, advocated by both Italian and Bulgarian author 14 . It also outlines two hypotheses of misconception. Th e fi rst, quoted above several times, could be called a classical situation of that theory of mistake -in that case the error lies in false representations of the subject revealing his will. Another hypothesis, however, includes in the scope of delusion the ignorance on circumstances that are important for the formation of the inner will of errans 15 . Is there any diff erence between these two second hypotheses of mistake? When: a) some object is completely missing in reality but the errans has formed certain subjective representation on its existence, on the one hand, and: b) the ignorance of errans, on the other? I think the answer is yes, because ignorance is tantamount to lack of any conception of reality, while in the other case there were some subjective perceptions formed, even though they diff er from the objective reality.
Meaning of Th eory of Mistake as a Simple Delusion
Analyzing the Pothier's thesis -the main supportive element of that theory of mistake -French researchers Ripert and Boulanger have stressed out on its general character. According to them, that concept of mistake can be applied to any intellectual activities 16 without distinguishing whether or not they have any legal consequences. Ripert and Boulanger's opinion should be shared. Moreover, it also fi ts to more actual defi nitions of mistake belonging to that theoretical direction. However, its importance should not be overlooked. And it is still widely spread in civilian doctrine. Secondly, the theory of mistake as a simple misconception has given a strong basis for further justifi cation of the nature of that ground for invalidation of contracts.
Th eory of Mistake as a Combination of Misbelief and Misconception (In Brief: Th eory of Mistake as a Combination)

Nature and Characteristics
Th is theory is a further development of the previous assumption, describing mistake as a psychic fact. Th eory of mistake as a combination adds a second component to the requirement of inadequate subjective perceptions on specifi c object of knowledge. Th is is the confi dence of errans that his false beliefs match reality. According to this theory, delusion is not suffi cient to justify the invalidation of a specifi c contract on the ground of mistake. In order to apply that reason for nullifi cation, there must be another component of mistake to exist -the confi dence that false misconception refl ects reality. Th e errans as its owner should believe in its truth, i.e. he has to be confi dent that his representations correspond to the referred object.
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I have already mentioned the "confi dence" and "belief " in the truth of delusion. Th ey both indicate the same component of mistake -the misbelief of misthat could be a subject of another detailed analysis. guided person. According to that theory of mistake, the combination of these two factors (misbelief and delusion) builds seeming knowledge in the mind of errans. Th eir simultaneous coexistence causes him entering into a specifi c agreement under mistake.
Th e misbelief must be distinguished from another state of mind -the doubt. An individual could have doubt whether specifi c individual representations match reality. While the fi rst is a positive fact, the same cannot be defi nitely said for the latter. Th e state of doubt is equivalent to hesitation that personal impressions diff er from reality. Th is guesswork eliminates the misbelief that ideas and reality match. Th erefore, suspicion of a particular person excludes his conviction that individual perceptions correspond to reality. Moreover -that doubt creates a probability that person could later realize he was wrong) 18 .
Hereinaft er I should analyze some theses belonging to that theoretical direction. Th ey attract my additional interest because of the ambiguity they contain. An opinion describes mistake as a discrepancy between subjective belief and reality 19 . Its author does not point out the delusion as a separate component of that ground for nullifi cation. Another statement sounds somewhat similar to the previous one, as it does not insist on the simultaneous coexistence of misbelief and misconception. However, in contrast with the former opinion, the latter considers interchangeable two elements of mistake and deems their alternative appearance as a suffi cient requirement of that ground for invalidation 20 .
If these views would be analyzed from the viewpoint of the theory of mistake as a combination, they should be described as inaccurate. To justify the existence of mistake, the conviction must be connected with certain misconceptions. Research for conviction of errans would make sense, if in this case his delusion could be found as well. In addition, the misbelief that individual perceptions match reality is diff erent from them. I could prove the latter using the fact that confi dence (either belief or misbelief) may exist in the state of mind, notwithstanding that individual impression conforms or not to reality. When we observe only conviction of certain subjective perceptions, they cannot be classifi ed as true or false. We need to examine their contents. 
Meaning of the Th eory of Mistake as a Combination
If the theory of mistake as a combination could be compared with the theory of mistake as a simple misconception, it would be established that the former applies misbelief as a second component of the psychological concept of mistake. An advantage of the theory of mistake as a combination is that most writers apply it in contractual relations. It is for sure that it makes easier the problem on the legal relevance of mistake for invalidation.
Objective Th eory of Mistake
21 (or Th eory of Mistake in Terms of Social Interaction)
Nature and Characteristics
Th eories of mistake as a psychic fact have been criticized in Italian literature. In the second half of the twentieth century there has been formulated a diff erent opinion on the nature of mistake as a ground for nullifi cation. In contrast with the subjective theories, that opinion explores mistake not as a fact in interiore hominis. It puts that phenomenon in a more diff erent context.
Objective theory investigates mistake as a fact occurring not only in the individual consciousness, but also puts it in lights of interpersonal communication 22 . Th at theory appeared consistently with the trends in contract law in the twentieth century. One of them is the focus on social and economic functions of agreements 23 .
Th e study of the error from this point of view rests on the premise that individuals serve with same tools (language, signs and symbols) -either to interact with each other or to perceive reality 24 . Th erefore the objective theory of mistake is infl uenced by language sciences, mainly by semiotics, which studies the problems of relationship between sign and language; of the meaning of signs in human communication 25 .
21 Th e name is somewhat arbitrary, since its adherents do not escape entirely from mistake's subjective roots. Th ey also use psychological arguments defi ning that vice of will. More precisely, this theory would be called "objectifi ed". Here, however, I prefer the name "objective" for the sake of brevity. Objective theory sets up as a major problem the way of determination if there is a mistake. Its followers 26 argue for the need of a predetermined criterion for assessment. Th at criterion is external to subjective consciousness. Some adherents call it "a scale of compliance" (termine di riferimento) 27 . Th us the concept of mistake has been "exported" outside the realm of certain individual psychic activity 28 . Th e scale of compliance is a product of interaction among people by linguistic means 29 . It consists of common sense of linguistic resources that have been used. Further on, that common sense has been created by social convention 30 . Bulgarian literature calls it the conventional or customary sense of used words and phrases 31 .
Under the objective theory 32 the occurrence of mistake depends on establishment of meaning, introduced by probable errans in linguistic means as a tool for refl ection of reality. It has to be checked out if that meaning coincides or diff ers from the common sense, established for the same linguistic means. Th e mistake could be detected when the meaning of linguistic means, used by errans, is diff erent from its conventional sense 33 on condition that the same object of reality has to be described. If we do not make such a comparison between personal sense and conventional sense of linguistic means, signs and symbols, we could not establish whether there is a divergence between an individual state of mind and objects of reality 34 . Th is divergence should be established by taking into account the expressed will of the alleged errans, his behavior, and other facts having material being. All these circumstances have to occur not later than the conclusion of contract 35 . In other words, material facts which have appeared by a certain moment in time, serve as a kind of objective limitation on the means of determination of mistake 36 . 
Importance of the Objective Th eory on Mistake. Relationships with Other Legal Institutions
Proponents of objective theory have cited it as a continuation of the idea of priority of the declaration over the will, both conceived as components of the legal construction on declaration of will (Willenserklaerung) 37 . However, it is not easy to conclude if this is the leading position in Bulgarian legal doctrine 38 . Th ere are some other opinions known on the issue. One of them gives priority of the will to the declaration, but adds signifi cant objective corrections 39 . It stays closer to the thesis, which examines the will and its declaration in their entirety 40 .
Supporters of this theory point out its two manifestations in Italian legislation 41 . Th ese arguments however, cannot be found in Bulgarian legislation.
All that I have already mentioned creates doubt about the perception of the objective theory of mistake by Bulgarian doctrine and case law. A strong negative answer to that question, however, would be outward. It is worth observing that the problems of common sense have also been discussed by Bulgarian doctrine in a more general level -that of interpretation of legal acts. It turns out that these problems also need to refl ect on the legal essays on mistake as a vice of consent.
Finally, I have already highlighted proximity between the objective opinion on mistake and other sciences as semiotics, psychology, etc. Th e last came to support the following conclusion. Despite the denial of subjective theories on mistake, the objective theory can not entirely avoid the psychological arguments 39 So Tashev, R. op. cit., pp. 104-107. 40 See Ganev, V. op. cit., pp. 172, 173; Vasilev, L. op. cit., pp. 385-386; Rieg, A. Op. cit., p. 9-11, 89-91; Ghestin, J. Op. cit., p. 346 to 348. In addition, last two researchers consider that dispute (on priority of the declaration or of the will) out of date.
41 Rossello, C. Ibid. Th e fi rst manifestation lies in the elimination of the distinction between the eff ects caused by mistake-vice of consent (errore-vizio) and mistake-obstacle (errore-ostacolo) for consent. Article 1433 of Codice civile italiano (CCI) provides avoidance for both of them, contrary to concepts adopted by French and Italian old literature. Th ese concepts discern mistake-vice of consent from mistake-obstacle. According to their view, the former is a factor leading to nullifi cation; the latter directly causes nullity of agreements. Bulgarian doctrine and case law is not aware of these two types of mistake. Th e second manifestation of objective theory is suggested by provisions of CCI on basic kinds of relevant mistake. Since they aff ect the object of the false state of mind, CCI eliminates further researches for subjective components of that state of mind -see Rossello, C. Op. cit., p. 7, 8. In my country, however, LOC is quite frugal from such provisions. (Its key provision is Art. 28, para. 1, which explicitly deals with 2 types of mistake only -mistake to the object and mistake to the person. Th at paragraph is similar to the art. 1110 of Code civil français, strongly infl uenced by ideas of Pothier). Naturally, prevailing Bulgarian doctrinal view on the relevant mistake states that the law is not exhaustive on the subject.
to justify the error as a ground for invalidation of agreements. Objective theory does not leave completely out the subjective perspective on mistake but provides greater clarity on the issue of its interpretation.
On the Suitability of Reviewed Th eoretical Directions. Conclusion
Uncertainties or ambiguities on various concepts of mistake can be avoided if we borrow diff erent aspects of represented theoretical directions.
So I would lay the theory of mistake as a combination in the foundation of the legal concept of mistake as a vice of will. Th at fact will provide continuity with the older notion of mistake as a simple delusion. Further on, the fi ndings of objective theory shall not be ignored. Th ey will be considered as interpretative principles to establish whether there is error-vice. In this way, a twofold eff ect could be achieved -borrowing foundations of mistake from subjective theories and respecting some conclusions of objective theory on mistake.
(denoted as its objective core) and b) determines the agreement 46 . Th is attempt was disputed by numerous theoreticians for diff erent reasons. Maybe the most important of them is that this set of facts is far from normative requirements for the relevance of error 47 . Under Art. 1428 of CCI to justify the invalidation of agreement, mistake must be substantial and identifi able by the other contract party.
Th e legal requirements on operative error elaborated by Spanish case law 48 are closer to those concepts. Th ey comprise of two components. Firstly, mistake must relate to the essential content of a specifi c contract. Th us it leads to conclusion of the latter. Secondly, the error has to be excusable. As we see, the fi rst component of the Spanish construction comprises of two elements identifi ed by previous attempts to establish common legal requirements on relevant mistake.
According to § 871 of the Austrian Civil Code 49 the error is legally relevant only if it refers to the principal object or an essential attribute of it to which the intention was principally and expressly directed. In addition, the errans has to prove one of three alternatives: a) that the other party caused the mistake or b) the error must have been obvious to the other party in all the circumstances, or c) that mistake was notifi ed to the other party in good time.
Let us look at the soft law sources of law. Article 3.2.1. of Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC -version 2010) denotes mistake as erroneous assumption relating to facts or to law existing when the contract was concluded. Th e following provision of the Principles entitles the mistaken party to avoid the contract only if at the moment when the agreement was concluded, the mistake was of such importance that a reasonable person in the same situation as the party in error would only have concluded the contract on materially diff erent terms or would have not concluded it at all if the true state of aff airs had been known, and a) the other party made the same mistake, or caused the mistake, or knew or ought to have known of the mistake and it was contrary to reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing to leave the mistaken party in error, or b) the other party has not reasonably acted, in reliance on the contract, at the time of avoidance; Th e approach of the Principles of European Contract Law and of the Draft of Common Frame of Reference does not diff er to that of PICC. As the latter Principles, their provisions indicate that errors in fact and in law are legally relevant -see Art. 4:103 PECL and Art. II-7: 201 DCFR 50 .
It should be recognized that in the doctrine we could fi nd another approach. It consists of casuistic analyzes of diff erent kinds of error and appreciation whether they are either legally relevant or irrelevant 51 . Th at approach follows tradition of Roman lawyers 52 . Th ey refrained from summarizing constituent elements of operative mistake.
Approach of Bulgarian Law
Let us now see what the situation in Bulgarian law is. Doctrine prefers the fi rst of the two approaches already outlined. Th e diffi culty comes from the problem that the stated legal requirements for relevant mistake have diff erent scopes. I fi nd it hard to go in details of main author's views on the problem. However, I could only illustrate my impression with the following example. For decades, the main textbooks in civil law were two. Based on the same legal provision (art. 28 LOC), one of them pointed out two, and the other -three elements, for the relevance of mistake for avoidance of contracts 53 .
Having in mind this problem, on the one hand, and the need to summarize legal requirements for relevant mistake under the prevailing views in our theory 54 , on the other hand, it can be concluded that the mistake in Bulgarian law is relevant for avoidance of contract if: a) Its components (delusion and misbelief) relate to constituent elements of contracts and b) It caused the conclusion of a specifi c agreement.
If we make a brief comparison between these legal requirements and those, outlined by foreign doctrine, of course we will fi nd some diff erences. Which are the most obvious? Bulgarian law does not involve additional criteria for a relevant error. For instance, it does not require a mistake to be identifi able or excusable.
In the meantime, by striving to summarize the features of the relevant error, our doctrine continues to keep Romanistic tradition of analysis of mistake. Along with the description of its legal requirements, Bulgarian theory explores main kinds of mistake and studies their legal signifi cance 55 .
In conclusion, it should be recognized that the second approach itself is not enough to appreciate the legal relevance of a certain type of mistake. Th erefore, it depends on the achievements of the fi rst approach. If we want to consider the legal relevance of any described type of error, it has to be put through the prism of legal prerequisites for that vice of will.
